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JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)0). 
ISSUES ON REVIEW 
A. Issue: Did the district court failed to grant all reasonable inferences and 
undisputed facts in favor of the Plaintiffs when it issued summary judgment in 
favor of the Defendants? 
1. Standard of Review. On appeal the court views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. HIGGINS V. SALT LAKE COUNTY, 855 P.2d 231,233 
(Utah 1993). Summary judgment is a question of law. No deference is 
accorded to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. V. NEWAYS, INC., 2006 UT App 33 TJ9. 
B. Issue: Are Plaintiffs entitled to specific performance of a real estate purchase 
contract after the Defendants failed to perform and after the Plaintiffs tendered 
their performance? 
1. Standard of review. Appeal of failure to grant specific performance is by 
review of "the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting 
them no deference." JOUFLAS V. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, 927 P.2d 170, 
174 (Utah 1996). PDQ LUBE CENTER, INC. V. HUBER, 949 P.2d 792, 797 
(Utah App. 1997) 
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Issue: Are Plaintiffs entitled to the benefit of promissory estoppel arising out of 
an oral agreement modifying terms of the real estate purchase agreement into a 
lease option? 
1. Standard of review. The dispositive issue here is whether promissory 
estoppel precludes Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds as a 
defense. This issue is a question of law. Where the issue is a question of 
law, appellate review gives no deference to the trial judge's determination. 
The reviewing court therefore applies a "correctness" standard, deciding 
the matter for itself. DRAKE v. INDUSTRIAL COMM'N, 939 P.2d 177,181 
(Utah 1997); F.C. STANGL, III V. ERNST HOME CENTER, 948 P.2d 356, 360 
(Utah App. 1997). 
Issue: Are Plaintiffs entitled to damages for breach of contract if their claims for 
specific performance and promissory estoppel are denied? 
1. Standard of review. If the language within the four corners of the 
contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law. DIXON V. PRO IMAGE, INC., 1999 UT 89, f 
14, 987 P.2d 48. The reviewing court therefore applies a "correctness" 
standard, deciding the matter for itself. DRAKE V. INDUSTRIAL COMM'N, 
939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997); F.C. STANGL, III V. ERNST HOME CENTER, 
948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). 
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E. Issue: Are Plaintiffs entitled to enforcement of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing relating to the REPC and/or Lease Option? 
1. Standard of review. Summary judgment is reviewed under the 
correctness' standard, affording the trial court's legal conclusions no 
deference." PALMER v. HAYES, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
Whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual 
issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law. WESTERN 
FARM CREDIT BANK V. PRATT, 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah App. 1993). 
F. Issue: Did the court properly interpret the Plaintiffs pleadings, motions to amend 
their complaints and motion to conform under Rule 15? 
1. Standard of review. Our review of the trial court's application of rule 
15(b) is a legal question that we review for "correctness." See STATE V. 
PENA, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
G. Issue: Is U.C.A. §78-40-2.5 in conflict with established rules of Utah law, and 
therefore unconstitutional? 
1. Standard of review. Statutes are presumed valid. GREAVES V. STATE, 
528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974). Any reasonable doubts are resolved in 
favor of constitutionality. STATE v. LOPES, 980 P.2d 191,16 (Utah 1999). 
H. Issue: Are Plaintiffs entitled to their attorney fees if they prevail on their appeal? 
1. Standard of review. This is an appeal from summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is reviewed under the 'correctness1 standard, affording the trial 
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courtfs legal conclusions no deference." PALMER v. HAYES, 892 P.2d 
1059, 1061 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
III. STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW. 
Cross motions for summary judgment resulted in orders disposing of this matter, 
from which a notice of appeal was timely filed by Appellants on April 10, 2006. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS 
Resolution of the case involves U.C.A. § 78-40-2 and §78-40-2.5; Rules 8, 15 and 
56 of the Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, as set forth in the addendum and the Statute of 
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953): 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or 
for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be 
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
And 
§ 78-27-1. Tender — Offer in writing sufficient. 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a 
written instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, 
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, 
instrument or property. 
V. A STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
In the fall of 2004 the Plaintiffs located and placed an offer on 280 acres with 
water in Duchenne County, Utah (the "Ranch). After the offer was written and accepted 
at $339,000, together with earnest money being paid, Plaintiffs began obtaining 
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financing. Plaintiffs qualified for sufficient funds to purchase the Ranch, but because the 
property was a working ranch they were required to seek financing from an agricultural 
lender. When this was discussed with the Defendants, the idea of a lease option was 
proposed and verbally agreed upon. Defendants had in 2003 obtained an appraisal of the 
Ranch for about $315,000. Defendants avoided appraisal problems with the lease option, 
which did not have a clause allowing Plaintiffs to cancel if the Ranch failed to appraise, 
whereas the real estate purchase agreement had such a clause. Plaintiffs were advantaged 
because the lease option allowed them to take advantage of a 1031 exchange. 
In September and October 2004 the parties cooperated in finalizing terms of the 
lease option - but while the terms were signed by Plaintiffs, no signed version was 
produced by Defendants. The Plaintiffs were invited to the Ranch and encouraged to 
work on it. The parties had determined that they were distant relatives, and everything 
proceeded well. 
However, just prior to closing the Defendants learned of a potential new offer, for 
significantly more money. They stalled the closing claiming problems with an earlier real 
estate listing agreement. In reality, the problem was quickly resolved, but the Plaintiffs 
were not told. As the closing with Plaintiffs was stalled, Defendants learned that the new 
offer was bona fide, and decided to accept it. The Defendants delayed the closing and in 
the beginning of November 2004 told the Plaintiffs that the new offer was accepted. 
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The REPC earnest money had not been returned. Plaintiffs immediately sent a 
tender and demand for performance letter, filed suit, filed a notice of lis pendens, and 
sought an injunction to bar the sale. The injunction was denied. 
This appeal is taken from related orders from cross motions for summary judgment 
which purportedly resolved the issues between the parties. The orders were substantially 
in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are appealing the adverse parts of 
the orders and seek enforcement of the REPC and/or the lease option. The orders deny 
Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief, relief through specific performance, promissory 
estoppel and related claims, which they are appealing against all Defendants. Plaintiffs 
appeal their right to amended complaints and/or a complaint to conform to the facts, 
which complaints were dismissed or denied by the trial court. Plaintiffs also appeal the 
order to release the lis pendens, and request attorney fees. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Ty and Marina Eldridge are husband and wife, residing in Morgan County, Utah 
(R at 5, 57). The Defendants are brothers living in Utah County, Utah and the 
owners of real property described as 280 acres with 120 shares of water located in 
Neola, Utah, (the "Ranch"). (R at 64-73.) 
2. Ty found the Ranch advertised on the Internet. On August 12, 2004 Ty called 
Defendant Jim Farnsworth ("Jim") and made arrangements to see the Ranch. Ty 
asked if Jim could meet them at the Ranch on Sunday August 15, 2004. Jim said 
he was the (LDS) Elders Quorum President and had to teach a class at church. Ty 
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asked if one of his brothers could meet them. Jim said he figured they would have 
similar problems with church obligations and that one of his brothers was a 
Bishop. (R at 210-211; Addendum Jim's Depo p 18, In 17-25, p 19, 20 In 1-8.) 
3. Ty asked about a realtor who had a sign at the Ranch. Jim said he was no longer 
under contract with the realtor. (R at 211) Jim then told Ty he would just give 
them a key to the Ranch. (R at 211;Addendum Jim Depo p 20 In 20-25, p 21 In 
1.) During this call Ty and Jim also discussed genealogy. Ty's mother's maiden 
name was Farnsworth. They determined that they were related. (R at 211; 
Addendum Jim's Depo p 21 In 2-15) 
4. On August 14, 2004 Marina and Ty met Jim and Jessica (Jim's wife) in Heber. 
The Farnsworths gave Ty and Marina a key to the house. During this visit the they 
talked more about common genealogy. (R at 211; Addendum Jim's Depo p 21 In 
16-25, p 22 In 1-8). The next day the Eldridges went to the Ranch. (R at 211) 
5. On August 16, 2004 Ty called Jim to make an offer and asked if the Farnsworths 
would include items on the Ranch such as personal property and farm equipment. 
Jim responded he would check with his brothers. (R at 211-212) On August 17, 
2004 Jim called Ty and said that Ty had to wait until Jim returned from a trip to 
Mexico before they would accept an offer - and that they had recently turned down 
an offer for $325,000 through a realtor. (R at 212; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 22 
In 12-25, p 23.) 
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6. On August 22, 2004 Jim called Ty, who made an offer for the Ranch with personal 
property at $330,000. Jim countered at $340,000, which Ty accepted. Jim said he 
would start the paperwork (R at 212; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 24 In 9-25, p 25-
28) 
7. August 23, 2004 Marina contacted Washington Mutual to arrange financing. (R at 
212) 
8. On August 24, 2004 Jim called Ty and identified some property which would not 
be included. Marina was upset that the riding mower was excluded. Jim agreed to 
take $1000 off the purchase price - down to $339,000. (R at 212, 228; 
Addendum, Jim's Depo p 27 In 4-17) On August 25, 2004 Jim faxed a REPC to 
Ty. Some minor changes were made. (R at 212; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 28 In 
18-25, p 29-36. On August 26, 20 Jim faxed the REPC with minor changes and 
signed by Jim. (R at 212, 233-239; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 28-36) Jim 
Farnsworth was authorized to enter into the REPC by his brothers. (Addendum, 
Jim's Depo p 30 In 5-8; David Farnsworth Depo. p 11 In 12-15.) On August 
27, 2004 the Eldridges signed the REPC and wrote a check to Basin Land and Title 
for $1000; then sent the REPC and earnest money check to Jim. (R at 212, 240.) 
9. On September 4, 2004 the Eldridges and Aaron Thomson went to the Ranch and 
met Jim, Jessica and two children. Jim walked Ty around the property pointing out 
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items that would not be included and gave Ty a general overview on how the water 
system worked. (R at 212; 279-280; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 40 In 9-15) 
On September 9, 2004 the Eldridges called Washington Mutual to check the status 
of the appraisal. Washington Mutual said it would not loan on the ranch portion of 
the property, but could loan on the house and one acre. (R at 213; 278-279) 
Washington Mutual approved the Eldridges for a $340,000 purchase. (R at 242-
243, 284-285) That same day Ty started contacting other lenders including Zion's, 
Wells Fargo, and Western Ag Credit. (R at 213-214) Ty also contacted Jim to tell 
him what was going on. Ty told him they had many options on funding but need to 
check around for the best rate and terms. Jim said he would do some checking as 
well. (R at 213-214; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 40 In 25, p 41-42, 43 In 1) On 
September 13, 2004, after speaking to the banks it became apparent that Ty would 
need $75,000 (instead of the $34,000 that Washington Mutual required) down to 
satisfy the banks for the loan. During a call to Western Ag Credit the loan officer 
informed him that the ranch had only appraised at $317,000.00 the year before 
(2003). The loan officer also told Ty that he could use property he owned free and 
clear in Wyoming for collateral on the down payment and could possible purchase 
the ranch without putting any money down. (R at 213-214; Addendum, Jim's 
Depo p 42 In 20-25, p 43, 44, 45. 
Seller disclosures were due by September 15, 2004 (R at 237) - were not provided 
by the Farnsworths at any time. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 36 In 23-25) he title 
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commitment due by September 15, 2004 (R at 237) was not provided by the 
Farnsworths at any time. (Addendum, J im's Depo p 37 In 1-3) 
On September, 19, 2004 Jim called back and informed Ty that he had been 
thinking about the owner financing and really liked the idea of the lease option. . 
(Addendum, Jim's Depo p 43 In 21-25, p 44, In 1-20) They discussed details on 
the option. Jim said they would structure it similar to standard owner financing but 
without changing the title to Ty's name. Jim said he liked the lease option idea 
because it would not require foreclosing if Ty defaulted. (R at 214) Jim said he 
would give Ty a rate better that the bank would charge but higher that the bank 
would give Jim for savings. . (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 47 In 9-25, p 46 In 1-3J 
Jim said he felt very comfortable about the lease option because he knew they 
really wanted the ranch and that with Ty's credit rating and assets he could easily 
fulfill the lease option. Jim also noted he would be making a good rate of interest 
on his money. (R at 214). Ty agreed to the lease option as it would allow them to 
do a 1031 exchange, saving the Eldridges thousands of dollars in capital gains 
taxes. (R at 214; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 45 In 1-4) Ty and Jim agreed to 
work out the details over the next few days. (R at 214) 
On September, 20, 2004 after receiving Jim's offer the Eldridges called 
Washington Mutual and canceled the loan application. (R at 215, 278-279; 246-
247; 284-287) 
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14. Sometime in September 2004 Jim cancelled the closing with Basin Land and Title 
without notifying the Eldridges. (Addendum Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants' 
First Discovery No. 6.) 
15. On September, 21, 2004 Jim offered Ty a 3 year lease option at 5 7/8% with 10% 
down. Ty countered with 5% interest. Jim said he would check with his brothers 
and reply. (Rat 215) 
16. About this time Jim admitted to Ty that the Ranch would not have appraised for 
the purchase price of $339,000. Jim told Ty that the Ranch had been appraised 
about a year prior (in 2003) for about $315,000 (R at 502-507). Ty felt the Ranch 
was still worth the purchase price and wanted to continue. (R at 215) 
17. On September, 26, 2004 Jim called Ty and made two more offers on the lease 
option. The first was 10% down, $1500.00 per month with zero going towards the 
balance. The second wasl0% down $1725.00 per month with $250.00 towards the 
balance. Each required the Eldridges to pay all taxes, water fees, utilities, and 
insurance. (R at 215; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 48 In 4-25, p 49 In 1-8.) On 
September, 27, 2004 Jim called Ty to see which offer Ty preferred. Ty countered 
at 10% down, $1675 per month, 25% towards principle with the other terms being 
the same. Jim agreed that they were very close and said he was actually happy to 
see that Ty had countered with a monthly payment that was higher than Jim's 
second offer ($1500.00 per month). Jim said he would talk to his brothers and 
would call back. (R at 215-216) Jim agreed to a three year term for the Lease 
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Option (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 45 In 20-25) The Eldridge offer calculates out 
to interest at the rate of 5.0912%. (Principle $329,000 - 10% down = $296,100. 
5.0912% divided by 12 months = monthly rate of .4243%. Payment of $1675 -
25% = $1256.25 interest, balance to principle. Monthly interest at 0.4243% times 
$296,100 = $1256.25. 
18. On September, 28, 2004 Jim called Ty and said he would take Ty's offer, but 
because they were not getting the rate that they wanted they wanted to make a side 
deal. Jim wanted to run 5 horses on the ranch while Ty was leasing it. (R at 216; 
Addendum, Jim's Depo p 49 In 18-21; David Depo p 27 In 1-5) Ty told him 
that it would be acceptable. Ty told Jim he would fill out on a form the terms to 
which they had agreed and that Jim could add any other details he felt necessary. 
(R at 216) On October 5, 2004 Ty started the rough draft of the lease option. That 
night Jim called and asked if Ty had sent the lease option paper work to him yet. 
Ty told Jim that he would get it sent off ASAP. (R at 216) On October 7, 2007 Jim 
called and stated he had not got the lease option in the mail yet. Ty told Jim he 
would send it out the next day. That night Ty typed up a page regarding the 
personal property. They had agreed that it would be best to purchase the personal 
property separately and that if Ty defaulted on the lease option that the personal 
property would be the Eldridges and the Farnsworths would not have to worry 
about the condition of the personal property. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 75 In 7-
13) Jim stated that his friend from Washington County was going to help him 
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review the agreement but was going out of town. Jim wanted his friend review the 
contract and told Ty to hurry. (R at 216) 
On October 9, 2004 Jim received the lease option in the mail. His wife opened the 
envelope but failed to remove the paper which contained the details on the 
personal property. It stated that Ty would pay $103000 for all the personal property 
in advance. The lease option itself required $24,000 down for the option with the 
balance sale price of $305,000. (Together: $10,000 + $24,000 + $305,000 = 
$339,000, the same as the original sales price.) (R at 216, 233-239, 250-251) 
Later that day Jim called and stated that if what he had in his hands was the deal 
then it was off. Jim had not seen the paper regarding the personal property. After 
Jim found and read the other paper he said everything was "back on track." (R at 
216) After further review, Jim called Ty back. Jim stated that the grace period for 
late payments was only 3 days and that they should change it to 30 days. Ty 
agreed.. (R at 216-217, Addendum, Jim's Depo p 53 In 3-7) Jim noted that the 
lease option was not to start until November. (R at 217) Jim also stated that he 
thought 10% of $339,000 would be $39,000. Ty corrected him that it actually was 
$33,900 but that Ty had just rounded up to $34,000. Jim agreed that the purchase 
price for the Ranch under the REPC and the Lease Option was the same price. 
(Addendum, Jim's Depo p 63, In 8-188; p 74 In 17-21) 
On October 12, 2004 Ty called Jim to see when they could close the deal. Ty left a 
message. (R at 217) 
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21. On October 16, 2004 Jim called back. Ty asked if they could get the key to the 
ranch house and that Ty's parents wanted to see the property. Jim said he would 
leave the key under his planter on his front porch. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 54 
In 23-25; p 55 In 1-8) Jim then said he would be at stake conference and would 
probably not be home. Jim gave Ty directions to his house. (R at 217) 
22. Ty also said that he had not received any info from the title company yet. Jim 
asked me what Ty needed from them. Ty told Jim he wanted information regarding 
easements through the property that would show up on the title report. (R at 217) 
Jim then told Ty that Ty probably hadn't gotten anything from them because Jim 
had canceled the closing. (R at 217; Addendum Plaintiffs5 Answers to 
Defendants' First Discovery No. 6.) Jim then told Ty that he had an old abstract 
from his father and he would leave the abstract out with the key if he could find it. 
(R at 217;Addendum, Jim's Depo p 55 In 9-19) Jim also told Ty to contact an 
escrow company to handle the payments for the lease option. Ty agreed. (R at 
217, 229;Addendum, Jim's Depo p 55 In 23-25, p 56 In 1-7) 
23. Jim then told Ty he was selling some of the horses on the ranch. Ty told Jim that 
he wanted to buy a horse. Jim offered the white horse for $500 which Ty agreed. 
Jim said he would make up a bill of sale for the horse and give it to Ty. (R at 218, 
Addendum, Jim's Depo p 56 In 15-25, p 56 In 1-7) 
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24. On Octoberl7, 2004 the Eldridges drove to Jim's house. When they got there was 
no abstract, only the key. They went to the Ranch with Ty's family. (R at 218) 
25. Jim admitted not providing the abstract. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 55 In 9-19) 
26. On October 21, 2004 and October 22, 2004 Ty called Jim and left messages. Ty 
was worried about bad weather and wanted to go to the Ranch to dry in the old 
homestead. On October 24, 2004, Ty still had not heard back from Jim. At this 
point the Eldridges decided to go ahead and go to the Ranch. At the Ranch they 
started applying foam insulation to the old homestead. Shortly thereafter Jim called 
Ty and said that he hoped that they had gone up to the Ranch and did the work 
they wanted to do and that he had been out of town. Ty told Jim that they were at 
the Ranch. Jim told Ty he would contact Ty during the week to set up closing. (R 
at 218, 229, 278-280; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 57 In 14-22) 
27. Later that evening Ty met Ranch neighbors Kent and Trina Bastian, who leased 
the Ranch for their cattle. They drove over and talked to the Eldridges while they 
were working on the old homestead. Kent told Ty that Jim had told him that he 
[Jim] had the place sold and that Jim Jim wanted Kent's cows off by November 1 
(the date on the Lease Option). The conversation between Jim and Kent Bastian 
was about 1-3 days earlier. (R at 218-219, 229, 253-255, 279; Addendum, Jim's 
Depo p 37 In 4-25, p 38, 39 In 1-7, p 58 In 3-20) 
28. On October 26, 2004 Jim stated to Ty that he was just about to go in and talk to his 
friend in St. George to finish the final draft of the lease option. Jim wanted to add a 
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few things to the lease option contract, including a clause prohibiting the tearing 
down of corrals, adding in detail what bills the Eldridges would be responsible for, 
and a clause allowing Jim and his brothers to sell the note. Ty agreed and they set 
October 28, 2004 for closing. (R at 219, Addendum, Jim's Depo p 53 In 3-12, p 
58 In 21-25, p 59 In 1-16) 
29. October 27, 2004 is Ty's birthday. His sister recorded Ty opening birthday 
presents. The entire party revolved around the Ranch and the new horse Ty was 
buying. In the video Ty references the fact that they will be closing the deal the 
next day, October, 28, 2004. (R at 219) 
30. On October 28, 2004 Ty called Jim at 2:50 PM to get directions and times for the 
closing. Jim did not answer his phone. Ty called back 4 more times over the next 4 
hours. Jim did not return the call until 10:23 PM. Jim informed Ty there was a 
problem with a realtor contract they had come across earlier in the evening while 
preparing for the lease option closing. Jim said they had co-listed the property with 
Alan Wade and Mr. Wilkerson of Western Land. Jim also said that the listing with 
Wade should have been for 6 months but it actually stated 12 months. Jim said that 
Ty should not worry and that Jim would get the problem resolved first thing in the 
morning. (R at 219-220;Addendum, Jim's Depo p 60, 611n 1-3; p 62 In 3-8) 
31. Jim also said that if the realtors were acting is bad faith that the Farnsworths would 
just lease the Ranch to the Eldridges until the end of the listing agreement, then 
add the option. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 61 In 1-25; pg 62, In 1-8) 
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On October 29, 2004 Ty contacted a realtor who helped Marina check the MLS to 
verify Jim's story regarding the active listing. Marina found it as an active listing 
for Alan Wade. Finding the listing confirmed Jim's story and made them feel at 
ease about the delay in closing. (R at 22-230) At 12:56 PM Jim called and said 
that they had not made any progress with the realtor. Ty then told Jim that they 
would pay half the realtor fee. Jim said his brothers would not take any less than 
what was agreed on. Ty then offered to pay the full fee and wanted to close the 
deal today. Jim stated that he didn't feel that the realtor should get any commission 
because the contract for the listing was supposed to be for 6 months but some how 
it was for 12 months. Jim said he was going to contact an attorney to see what they 
could do. (R at 220;Addendum, Jim's Depo p 62 In 10-25, p 63 In 1-20) The 
Farnsworths never contacted an attorney about the real estate agent listing 
problem. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 63 18-22) 
Ty told Jim that he planned to spend the weekend on the ranch. Jim said to go 
ahead and go but that they should not do much work. (R at 220) Ty asked Jim "if 
we were willing to pay the entire fee - the hurdle to the signing of the lease option 
- why should we not feel free to do any work?" Jim then stated that he felt bad 
about all the promises he had made and that he did not want to make anymore. 
This bothered Ty. He asked Jim if there were any other problems. Jim said that 
there were none. Ty asked if the brothers had any problems with the deal? Jim 
stated that there were none. Ty then stated that if there were no other problems 
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and he was willing to pay the extra $10,000 they should close today. (R at 220) 
Jim said they should wait until the problem was resolved and go to the ranch and 
relax. Aaron, Marina and Ty left that night for the Ranch. They took a trailer 
including more insulation and plywood for the ranch house (R at 220, 229, 280). 
34. On October 29, 2004 at 10:30 AM, David Farnsworth spoke with Alan Wade and 
noted on Wade's listing "...we owe him nothing on sale or lease of the premises, 
unless one of the people he showed wanted to buy." (R at 263). 
35. On or about October 29, 2004, also unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Byron Gibson 
through Bob West of R.S. West and Gerald Wilkerson of Western Land and Realty 
presented an offer to Jim Farnsworth to purchase the Ranch for $400,000, accepted 
by James Farnsworth on November 12, 2004. (R at 266-277) 
36. On October 30, 2004 Jim and his brother showed up at the ranch while Ty, Marina 
and Aaron were there.. The Farnsworths removed the items that had been agreed 
that would not be included, including the riding lawn mower. (R at 221, 229, 280) 
Ty tried to pay Jim for the horse. Jim refused and said Ty could just pay for the 
horse when they closed the lease option contract in the next 7-10 days. R at 221, 
229, 280; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 78 In 1-9) While Jim was loading the 
remaining items that were not included in the deal he asked Marina if she wanted 
an old box of books that was in one of the bedrooms. She said "not really" and Jim 
asked her if it would be ok it he took them. She said it would be fine. (R at 230, 
Addendum, Jim's Depo p 77 In 1-25) Jim then told Marina that he was going to 
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contact an attorney on Monday November 1st to resolve the realtor commission 
problem. (R at 230; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 78 In 15-21) While Jim was 
walking back to his truck Ty asked him if he would show him how to shut of the 
main water for the winter. Jim and Ty took the old ATVs and Jim showed Ty how 
to winterize the water system. (R at 221, 281-282; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 19 
In 8-17.) Jim also suggested that Ty purchase 10 cows, place them on Ty's Morgan 
County Property and then move them to the Ranch in the spring. (R at 221, 281-
282) Jim offered to breed the horse Ty was buying if Ty brought her to Jim. (R at 
280-281; Addendum, Jim's Depo p78 In 11-14) 
37. Just before Jim left, he stopped on the porch and asked Ty if the view was worth 
$400,000. Ty agreed. Jim then stated that "everyone was mad at him." Ty asked 
why. Jim said that someone wanted to make an offer on the property, but Jim told 
him it was already sold. (R at 221, 280-281) 
38. On October 30, 2004 Jim knew the Eldridges wanted to acquire the Ranch. 
(Addendum, Jim's Depo p 80 In 1-6) 
39. On October 28, 2004 the Farnsworths received another offer on the Ranch. 
(Addendum, Jim's Depo p 84 In 25, p 85 lnl-4) 
40. Prior to October 30 the Farnsworths had not told the Eldridges that there was no 
deal between them. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 86 In 6-10) 
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41. On November 4, 2004 Jim signed Addendum No. 3 to the REPC with Gibson and 
on the same date it was accepted by Byron Gibson. (R at 275; Addendum, Jim's 
Depo p 100 In 22-24) 
42. On November 5, 2004 Ty called Jim and left a message. (R at 222) On November 
8, 2004 Jim returned the call. Jim stated that they had received an offer of 
$400,000. Jim said to "wait and see what happened" as "these deals fall through 
all of the time." Ty reiterated that they would do whatever it took to get the Ranch. 
Jim said that he might have already signed the paperwork. Ty said that the Ranch 
was worth the extra money. Jim said he would call his brothers and see what they 
could do. Ty asked if realtors were involved in the new deal, which Jim admitted. 
(R at 222) Later, Jim called back and said that if Ty raised $390,000 cash within 
two days, that they would sell Ty the property, but without the personal property. 
(R at 222; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 94 In 8-12). Ty said he would try. (R at 
222; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 94 In 13-14) Ty immediately called friends 
whom he felt could give him a bridge loan, so he could match the new offer. 
However, it took several days to arrange the financing. (R at 221-222) 
43. On November 9, 2004, Plaintiffs caused their attorney to send a tender of Plaintiffs 
performance. (R at 293.) Plaintiffs also filed suit seeking enforcement of the 
REPC (specific performance), injunctive relief and damages. (R at 5-6) 
44. On November 12, 20 Jim called Ty. Ty express his great disappointment and 
frustration. Ty expressed that they had made several deals which clearly showed 
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that they were all in concert so that Ty and Marina could get the Ranch. Ty 
expressed he felt betrayed - that Ty felt that Jim was a friend and a relative - they 
were family. Ty asked Jim how he felt. Jim stated he could see Ty's side, but that 
$61,000 was a lot of money. Jim also said that most people would do what Jim 
had done, but that it was the wrong thing to do. Jim said if Ty was not going to 
come up with the money, he would sell the property to the other buyers. Ty then 
said that Jim should not do so. Jim got mad, and hung up. (R at 223) 
45. The Gibson purchase/sale is subject to the outcome of this lawsuit. (R at 266-277; 
Addendum, Jim's Depo p 115 In 6-17) The money paid by Gibson is in an 
interest bearing account. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 116 In 9-11) 
46. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for Preliminary Injunction (R at 7-10). A hearing on 
the injunction was held November 29, 2004. The court entered its order denying 
the injunction on December 21, 2004 (R at 47-50). 
47. An amended complaint was filed on January 24, 2005 (R at 57-63) requesting 
specific performance, injunctive relief, damages, attorney fees, and punitive 
damages arising from theories of contract, promissory estoppel, waiver and fraud. 
48. Defendants answered and counterclaimed on February 3, 2005 (R at 64-73) 
Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim on March 15, 2006 (R at 92-95) and 
specifically referenced the allegations in the original complaint. (R at 94) 
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49. A second amended complaint requesting specific performance, injunctive relief, 
damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages arising from theories of contract, 
promissory estoppel, waiver and fraud was filed on December 13, 2005 (R at 467-
473, 521) Cross Motions for Summary Judgment were filed in 2005. The court 
issued its first order January 11, 2006, granting summary judgment for Defendants. 
(R at 508-517) 
50. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider. (R at 553-567, 582-599, 610-621) The 
court issued its order March 29, 2006, essentially denying the issues which were 
raised by Plaintiffs and granting judgment for Defendants, except as to the lis 
pendens issue. (R at 661-669) 
51. On March 14, 2006 Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend the Complaint to 
Conform to the Evidence, which was denied by the court (R at 643-648, 779-782). 
52. On April 24, 2006 the court dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim alleging an 
unlawful lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice. (R at 730). 
53. On May 15, 2006 the court ruled that Plaintiffs could not amend their complaint after the 
order on summary judgment, and denied the Plaintiffs the right to seek monetary 
damages (R at 779-782), changing its order of January 11, 2006. (R at 510). 
54. On June 21, 2006 the court granted Plaintiffs' supersedeas bond request, but set the 
amount at $100,000. (R at 800-803). 
55. On August 16, 2006 the court reversed itself and ordered the lis pendens released. 
(Addendum) 
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VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
A. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment because the court failed to follow the requirements of Rule 56. 
Plaintiffs stated facts by affidavits which were not disputed by Defendants. 
The factual inferences from those affidavits were not granted for the 
Plaintiffs. The court should have, at a minimum, found that there were 
material issues in dispute which required trial. 
B. Plaintiffs never abandoned the REPC. When it became clear the 
Defendants were repudiating the REPC, the Plaintiffs tendered their 
performance. The Court failed to properly consider the contractual rights of 
Plaintiffs in the REPC, and erred in not granting specific performance. 
C. The lower court did not properly interpret the principles of promissory 
estoppel. Because the parties had the written, signed REPC the Statute of 
Frauds was satisfied, which was orally modified by . The oral modification 
of the REPC through the lease option was an abandonment by the 
Defendants of rights they had under the REPC. Their conduct showing 
their intent was documented in detail. 
D. Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for breach of contract if their claims for 
specific performance and promissory estoppel are denied. The court 
initially - erroneously - suggested that the Plaintiffs could file another suit 
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for damages. However, the Plaintiffs had already requested breach of 
contract in their complaint and were entitled to have that issue considered. 
E. The court failed to consider the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
This covenant is inherent in all contracts. By virtue of the Defendants 
breach of the REPC and their unilateral sabotage of the REPC so they could 
sell to a higher bidder, the Defendants stand in violation of the covenant. 
F. The Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice and moved to conform the 
complaint to the evidence. The First Amended Complaint did not set forth 
all of the claims in the original complaint. Defendants answered and 
counterclaimed. In Defendants' answer they alleged abandonment of the 
initial claims. Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim and specifically 
referenced inclusion of the original claims. The Rules of Civil Procedure 
call for liberal interpretation of pleadings, which include answers to 
complaints and counterclaims. The Rules allow for amendment of 
pleadings to conform to the evidence. Further, the parties argued all of the 
issues in cross motions for summary judgment. Although summary 
judgment is not a trial, it involves the court acting as a finder of fact and 
when issues are argued, it is proper to allow the complaint to be amended 
for all issues argued in the motions. 
G. The court initially dismissed the lis pendens issues with prejudice and 
allowed the lis pendens to remain, then later reversed itself and ordered the 
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lis pendens released, pursuant to §78-40-2.5. The statutes and case law are 
in conflict. The court should protect the property rights of litigants until a 
case is ultimately resolved, even on appeal. 
H. Attorney fees should be granted to Plaintiffs if they prevail because they are 
provided for in the (REPC) contract, or as consequential damages under the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
VIII. THE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW is based on the 
orders of the trial court arose out of cross motions for summary judgment, from 
which a notice of appeal was timely filed by Appellants on April 10, 2006. The 
orders failed to properly apply the facts and law. 
IX. ARGUMENT. 
A. Issue: the District Court Failed to Grant All Reasonable Inferences and 
Undisputed Facts in Favor of the Plaintiff When it Issued Summary 
Judgment in Favor of the Defendants. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. HlGGINS V. SALT LAKE COUNTY, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because entitlement to summary 
judgment is a question of law, no deference is accorded to the trial court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. V. NEWAYS, INC., 2006 UT App 
33 19. 
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The trial court failed to grant all inferences in favor of Appellants in its orders and 
in fact granted inferences of material issues of fact in favor of the Defendants. The 
following facts should have been construed in favor of Appellants. 
Plaintiffs claim that they never abandoned their interest in the REPC. The court 
ruled that Plaintiffs did abandon their interest, but did not identify any admission or fact 
pointing to the Plaintiffs abandonment, other than the claim was not specifically relisted 
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in the amended complaint. (R at 510, 666, 782-783) The court ignored that the Plaintiffs 
specifically referenced this claim in their answer to the counterclaim. (R at 94) Had the 
court not made this assumption, the Plaintiff claim for specific performance and contract 
rights would have compelled the court to issue an order granting the Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs claim that they had the financial ability to purchase the property under 
the REPC, but opted for the lease option as it presented them tax benefits. Defendants 
claim that Plaintiffs did not have the ability to purchase under the REPC. The court found 
that Plaintiffs encountered financing problems. (R at 510). Plaintiffs testified and 
provided supporting documents that they had he ability to obtain financing. (R at 222, 
231, 242, TRO Hearing p 56-57) If Plaintiffs had the ability to purchase under the 
REPC, then there is no evidence they would have abandoned the REPC, as the court 
held. 
Plaintiffs claim that they tendered their performance under the REPC after they 
learned that the Defendants had rejected the lease option and were considering another 
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purchase offer. The court did not find any tender. (R at 665) If Plaintiffs' tender was 
proper then Defendants should have been compelled to honor the REPC. (See below at 
Issue B.) 
Plaintiffs claim that the material terms of the lease option were entered into with 
the Defendants which terms were based on the REPC. The court ruled that there was no 
agreement, and that there was no writing supporting promissory estoppel. (R at 510-513) 
If the parties had entered into the material terms of a lease option, based on the REPC, 
then Plaintiffs would have been entitled to the benefit of promissory estoppel. 
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants intentionally misrepresented their claim that 
the realtor's listing was impeding the sale as the excuse for not closing on the lease 
option, so they could evaluate the later sale. (R at 219-220, 197-199, 263) If construed in 
favor of Plaintiffs, this evidence affirms that the Defendants believed that they had a deal 
with the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs listed 19 facts which demonstrate the Defendants' actions which support 
that they believed that there was a binding agreement. (R at 216 et seq.) If even some of 
these facts are construed in favor of Plaintiffs, then summary judgment was inappropriate. 
(Examples: Fact 2, the Defendants encouraged Plaintiffs to visit and work on the Ranch 
up to the end of October, 2004. (R 211, 212, 217-218, 220-221) Fact 11, Defendants 
told Bastians to remove their cattle from the Ranch because it was sold as of November, 
1, 2004. (R at 218-219, 229, 253-255, 279; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 37 In 4-25, p 38, 
39 In 1-7, p 58 In 3-20) Fact 13, Defendants verified on October 29, 2004 that there was 
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no real estate commission payable if the realtors had not shown the property to the 
prospective buyer or lessor. (R at 263) Fact 17, Defendants showed Plaintiffs how the 
water system worked on October 30, 2004, concurrent with the planned closing on the 
lease option. (R at 221) 
The above facts and those discussed below should have been construed in favor of 
Plaintiffs, and if so done, would not justify the court's orders on summary judgment. 
B. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Specific Performance of a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract after the Defendants Failed to Perform and after 
the Plaintiffs Tendered Their Performance? 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy to compel parties to a contract to 
perform its terms. 
"To obtain a decree for specific performance against a defaulting party, the 
aggrieved party must make an unconditional tender of the performance 
required by the agreement. Neither party to an agreement "can be said to be 
in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for 
specific performance) until the other party has tendered his own 
performance." In other words, "a party must make a tender of his own 
agreed performance in order to put the other party in default." (Cites 
omitted.) KELLEY v. LEUCADIA FIN. CORP., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 
1992); 
However, 
"Tender is excused where 'it is plain and clear that a tender, if made, "would 
be an idle ceremony and of no avail." "This court has held "tender to be 
fruitless and thus excused where the lienor states that he or she does not 
intend to accept payment, [and] where the lienor claims a larger sum than 
he or she is entitled to collect." If a demand for "a larger sum is so made 
that it amounts to an announcement that it is useless to tender a smaller 
sum, it dispenses with" the tender requirement. Additionally, "[w]here the 
unreasonable conduct of the obligee would make an actual tender a fruitless 
gesture, an offer to comply with the terms of the contract by the obligor is 
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sufficient." (Cites omitted) SHIELDS V. HARRIS, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
Utah case law is in harmony with Sheilds: U.C.A. § 78-27-1. 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written 
instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the 
actual production and tender of the money, instrument or property. 
The parties executed the REPC, earnest money was paid. The Defendants 
breached the REPC first in failing to provide property disclose and title commitments as 
required by the REPC. (Addendum, Jim's Depo p 36 In 23-25; p 37 In 1-3) On October 
16, when Ty asked for title information, Jim admitted he cancelled escrow, but promised 
to provide the title information. The parties agreed on a new closing date, October 28. By 
then Defendants had learned of a new offer at a higher price. Defendants then concocted 
a false story that there were problems with a realtor to avoid closing and apparently gain 
more time to verify the new offer. When Defendants admitted that they had accepted a 
greater offer and demanded more from Ty - he immediately tendered. (R at 293) Under § 
78-27-1 the offer by the letter of November 9, 2004 was a proper tender. 
Defendants claim that the tender should have been made on October 24, 2004, the 
original closing date. However in PDQ LUBE CENTER, INC. V. HUBER, 949 P.2d 792, 799 
(Utah App. 1997) this court stated: 
However, an action for specific performance may also be maintained if the 
plaintiff presents an excuse for his failure to make such payment or tender 
and avers his ability, readiness and willingness to pay the contract amount. 
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The initial closing date was on a Sunday. The parties had agreed to another date, 
October 28, 2004. Tender could have been made earlier, but for (1) the good faith belief 
that the lease option reflected the agreement and (2) the Defendants' fraudulent scheming 
to use the realtor issue as the means to delay closing. These are reasonable "excuses" for 
not tendering earlier. 
In its ruling the lower court simply stated it accepted Defendants' arguments that 
neither party tendered performance. (R at 665) The court apparently ignored the letter of 
November 9, 2004, which unconditionally tendered the Plaintiffs' performance and 
demanded that the Defendants perform. (R at 293) This letter met the requirements of 
U.C.A. §78-27-1. Defendants ignored this letter. 
Defendants' arguments are summarized that the Plaintiffs never tendered together 
with production of the money prior to the closing date. (R at 585-588) Their argument, 
accepted by the lower court, fails because of the following: 
1. Actual tender is not required when it would be fruitless. 
2. Defendants had breached first by failing to provide disclosures and the title 
commitment. 
3. The Defendants had already accepted a greater price, and had made demand 
on Plaintiffs for a greater price. See, SHIELDS 934 P.2d at 655. 
Furthermore, by statute a written offer to pay is sufficient. U.C.A. § 78-27-1. 
Finally the Plaintiffs had reasonable excuses to not tender earlier, (parties agreed 
to a later closing date; Defendants lied about needing more time to get realtor commission 
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issue resolved; and Defendants had reasserted the lease option closing after the October 
24 deadline in the REPC.) See, PDQ, 949 P.2d at 799. As a matter of law the Plaintiffs' 
written tender was sufficient and they were justified in making the tender two weeks later 
after the Defendants absolutely refuted the REPC. 
The trial court further erred in concluding that the REPC had been abandoned by 
both parties prior to the negotiations beginning on the lease option. (R at 510) Plaintiff's 
testimony contradicts this conclusion. (R at 225-226, Temporary Injunction Hearing 
38:16-23) The court at the temporary injunction hearing stated: "Assuming but not 
finding that Mr. Eldridge still has his real estate purchase contract in the hole, I'm not so 
sure he abandoned that entirely to go with the proposed lease." (Temporary Injunction 
Hearing 68:8-12) Since that hearing the court was presented with additional affidavits 
from Plaintiffs that they had not abandoned the REPC, nor any rights under its terms. (R 
at 222- 226, 228-230) Defendants never presented any evidence to the contrary. 
It was error for that court to conclude that as a matter of law that the REPC had 
been abandoned by the Plaintiffs. Summary judgment requires that this disputed fact be 
construed in the Plaintiffs' favor. This court should order that the REPC be enforced. 
C. Issue: Are Appellants Entitled to the Benefit of Promissory Estoppel 
Arising out of an Oral Agreement Modifying Terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement into a Lease Option? 
The Utah Supreme Court defined promissory estoppel, stating: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if 
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injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 
TOLBOE CONSTR. CO. V. STAKER PAVING & CONSTR. CO., 682 P.2d 
843, 845 (Utah 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 90(1981)). 
This concept was reasserted in McKlNNON V. CORPORATION, ETC., LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, 529 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1974): 
In RAVARINO V. PRICE [123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953)] this 
court explained that an estoppel will not arise simply because of a 
breach of promise as to future conduct or because of a 
disappointment of expectations of an executory agreement. An 
exception is recognized when a misrepresentation as to the 
future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the 
party making the misrepresentation, i.e., the promise as to future 
conduct must constitute a manifestation that the promissor will 
abandon an existing right which he possesses. Supra. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this concept as the current rule in Utah to matters 
concerned with the Statute of Frauds: 
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel ha[s] been extended, in a limited 
form, to those cases concerned with . . . the [s]tatute of [fjrauds, where the 
promise as to future conduct constitute^] the intended abandonment of an 
existing right of the promissor." McKlNNON 529 P.2d at 436; see also 
STANGL, 948 P.2d at 363. FERICKS V. LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST, 2004 UT 85 
100 P.3d 1200 1fl4 (Utah 2004) 
Following its explanation of promissory estoppel, the STANGL court noted 
restrictions on promissory estoppel and real property: 
In situations involving the purchase or lease of real property, however, Utah 
cases have narrowly circumscribed the application of promissory estoppel 
to the statute of frauds. A defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of 
frauds as a defense only when he or she has expressly and unambiguously 
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waived the right to do so." F.C. STANGL, III V. ERNST HOME CENTER, 948 
P.2d 356, 360-361 (Utah App. 1997) 
Both McKlNNON and STANGLE were discussed in FERICKS V. LUCY ANN SOFFE 
TRUST, 2004 UT 85 100 P.3d 1200 U113-14 (Utah 2004): 
f 13 In both McKinnon and Stangl, the plaintiffs, who were parties to oral 
agreements deemed void under the statute of frauds, sought to enforce the oral 
agreements against the defendants, who were the other parties to the oral contracts. 
McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436; Stangl, 948 P.2d at 359. The plaintiffs in both cases 
argued that because they had acted in reliance on the defendants' oral 
representations, the defendants should be estopped from asserting the statute of 
frauds as a defense. McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436; Stangl, 948 P.2d at 360. 
f 14 In rejecting this assertion in McKinnon, we explained that "the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel ha[s] been extended, in a limited form, to those cases 
concerned with . . . the [s]tatute of [f]rauds, where the promise as to future conduct 
constitute^] the intended abandonment of an existing right of the promissor." 529 
P.2d at 436; see also Stangl, 948 P.2d at 363. It was in this context that we stated 
that "[f]raud [necessary to establish promissory estoppel], generally, cannot be 
predicated upon the [mere] failure to perform a promise or contract which is 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds," as such a rule would virtually eviscerate 
the effect of the statute. McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436; see also Stangl, 948 P.2d at 
362. Rather, in order to establish the promissory estoppel exception to the 
statute of frauds, "ftlhe acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly 
manifest an intention that he will not assert the statute that to permit him to 
do so would be to work a fraud upon the other party." McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 
437; see also Stangl, 948 P.2d at 363. (Emphasis added.) 
The lower court, in denying promissory estoppel, founded its order on its 
conclusion that both parties had abandoned the REPC. (R at 519) Once the court declared 
the REPC "abandoned" it was easy for the court to dismiss promissory estoppel because 
there was no underlying writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. But the Plaintiffs never 
abandoned the REPC. (Supra) 
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The court then concentrated on this language from STANGL: "A defendant is 
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense only when he or she has 
expressly and unambiguously waived the right to do so." STANGL, 948 P.2d at 361. The 
court also relied on: "Parties to contract negotiations should be entitled to rely on the 
statute of frauds absent a clear manifestation of intent to claim no reliance." STANGL, 948 
P.2dat365. 
The court erred in not considering the holding in FERICKS: 
Rather, in order to establish the promissory estoppel exception to the statute 
of frauds, M[t]he acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly manifest 
an intention that he will not assert the statute that to permit him to do so 
would be to work a fraud upon the other party. FERICKS at f^ 14. 
It is the acts and conduct of the Farnsworths which the lower court failed to 
consider. Plaintiffs listed 19 facts - mostly undisputed - which reflect conduct by the 
Defendants manifesting abandonment of the existing rights they enjoyed under the REPC. 
(R at 216)1 By failing to declare default or insist on performance, while agreeing to the 
lease option and encouraging the Eldridges to visit and work on the Ranch, the 
Farnsworths indicated that they still intended to sell them the Ranch, but on the terms 
negotiated in the lease option. As late as about October 22, 2004, Jim told Kent Bastian 
to remove his cattle from the Ranch by November 1, 2004 - the date of possession under 
the lease option agreement. Bastian also said Jim told him November 1 was the date of 
closing - a date which is not relevant to any other agreement. (R at 218-219, 229, 253-
1
 The record contains a mistake in numbering, going from 212 back to 192. 
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255, 279; Addendum, Jim's Depo p 37 In 4-25, p 38, 39 In 1-7, p 58 In 3-20) On 
October 29, 2004, David Farnsworth spoke with Alan Wade and noted on Wade's listing 
"...we owe him nothing on sale or lease of the premises, unless one of the people he 
showed wanted to buy." (R at 263) There was no reason for David to make this note 
unless they were preventing a realtor problem prior to closing the lease option. Notably 
the Defendants did not return the earnest money. Additionally, under the REPC the 
earnest money should have been returned if the Plaintiffs did not obtain financing. (R at 
234) The Defendants retained the earnest money because they thought they either had a 
deal in the lease option or under the REPC purchase. 
The Defendants claim that they 'never ever discussed a closing' (Addendum, 
Jim's Depo p 59:22-25), nor the REPC, while at the same time asserted that they were 
discussing the lease option for over six weeks (Addendum, Jim's Depo 48:9-18) and 
while allowing the Eldridges to visit and work at the Ranch. They cannot now assert that 
they are using the Statute of Frauds as a defense without perpetrating a fraud on the 
Eldridges, whom they knew all along wanted the Ranch. (Addendum Jim's Depo p 80 
In 1-6 ) These and the other of the 19 items show the Farnsworths' manifest abandonment 
of the REPC in favor of the lease option. 
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D. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Damages for Breach of Contract If 
Their Claims for Specific Performance and Promissory Estoppel Are 
Denied? 
"Where a plaintiff seeks specific performance of a contract and that relief is not 
available, the trial court may grant monetary damages for breach of contract." (Cites 
omitted). RICHARDS V. BAUM, 914 P.2d 719, 720 (Utah 1996) 
Plaintiffs are still entitled to damages under the contract since they did not 
abandon the REPC (Supra Issue A). If their claims for relief under specific performance 
and promissory estoppel are not granted, they are specifically allowed damages. 
The terms of the contract require that the Defendants sell the Plaintiffs the Ranch 
for the sum of $339,000. A local realtor, familiar with property in the area and involved 
in the Gibson purchase stated in 2006 that property near the Ranch was appreciating at 
21% per year. (R at 792) The property was sold to the Gibson buyers for $390,000 -
$61,000 more than the REPC, reflecting rising property prices. 
Had the REPC been performed, the Plaintiffs could have sold the property to the 
Gibsons for $390,000. The Plaintiffs are entitled at a minimum to damages of at least 
$61,000, but should be allowed to put on evidence for the difference between the time of 
sale and the date which Plaintiffs will be entitled to damages. 
E. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Enforcement of the Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing Relating to the Repc And/or Lease Option? 
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by 
contrast, is based on judicially recognized duties not found within the four corners of the 
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contract. See BECK V. FARMERS INS. EXCH., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). These duties, 
unlike the duties expressly stated in the contract, are not subject to alteration by the 
parties. They exist whenever a contract is entered and are imposed on the parties 
"consistent with the agreed common purpose" of the contract. ST. BENEDICT'S DEV. CO. V. 
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSP., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991). The agreed upon common purpose 
here was the transfer of the Ranch to Plaintiffs for $339,000 - including personal 
property. 
Defendants breached the covenant when they lied to the Plaintiffs about the 
problem with the realtors. The "problem" was first identified on October 28, 2004. The 
next day David talked with the realtor and made a notation on the listing agreement that 
no commission would be paid if the property were sold or lease to someone not shown the 
property by the realtor. However, the Defendants kept this ruse alive for about another 
two weeks because their intent was to frustrate the terms of the REPC and the lease 
option if they could get an offer for more money. 
Defendants breached the covenant again when they kept avoiding Plaintiffs' 
request to close. If Defendants believed that the REPC had been abandoned by both 
parties, or that the Plaintiffs could not perform, they should have returned the earnest 
money or should have come to the closing and declare the Plaintiffs in default when they 
could not produce. Obviously the parties really had agreed to the lease option but at the 
last moment Defendants thought they could get the greater price. Instead of being honest 
with the Plaintiffs, the Defendants simply delayed closing - thus keeping both the lease 
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option and/or REPC and the new possible offer alive. This is a breach of the covenant. 
Attorney fees are awarded for breach of the covenant. LlEBER V. ITT HARTFORD INS. 
CTR. INC., 15 P.3d 1030, f 16 (Utah 2000). Consequential damages are also awarded. 
MACHAN v. UNUM LIFE INS. CO. O F AMERICA, 116 P.3d 342, f9 (Utah 2005). 
F. Issue: Did the Court Properly Interpret the Plaintiffs' Pleadings, 
Motions to Amend Their Complaints and Motion to Conform under 
Rule 15? 
This court recently made a comprehensive review of the Utah law on pleadings in 
COWLEY V. PORTER, 2005 UT App 518 ffi[ 36-38 (Case No. 20040827-CA.) (Addendum). 
T[36 Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the general pleading 
requirements, stating that a complaint "shall contain . . . a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(1). The rule is designed to provide notice of the nature of the claims 
asserted against a defendant and an opportunity to meet those claims. See 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Rule 8(f) 
provides that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). "Pleadings" include both the complaint and the answer. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7(a) (emphasis omitted). "When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). An 
amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can be made by either 
party at any time, even after judgment is entered. See id. Yet, the failure to amend 
"does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." Id. Finally, rule 54(c)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1); 
(citations omitted).... (Emphasis added) 
T{ 37 The fundamental purpose of these rules is to "liberaliz[e] both pleading and 
procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). In Cheney, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the failure of the defendants to plead a subsequent agreement as 
an affirmative defense was not fatal to the trial court's consideration of that 
agreement. See id. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument to the contrary, the court 
explained: 
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What [a party is] entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to 
meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules 
provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues 
bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a 
reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b) [of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure] so states....(citations omitted) 
Tf 38 Rule 54(c)(1) requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding appropriate relief 
justified by the facts developed at trial, as long as the failure to request a 
particular form of relief does not prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of the 
case. If there is no prejudice, it is necessary only that the relief granted be 
supported by the evidence and be a permissible form of relief for the claims 
litigated. Henderson, 757 P.2d at 472 (quotations and citations omitted). COWLEY 
v. PORTER, 2005 UT App 518 ffi[ 36-38 (Case No. 20040827-CA.) 
The court denied Plaintiffs request for an amendment for damages in its March 20, 
2006 ruling claiming that Plaintiffs had abandoned their claims from their initial to 
subsequent complaints. (R at 669). The court also denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
the Complaint to Conform to the Evidence. (R at 782) 
The court erred in concluding that the Plaintiffs had not included causes of action 
in its pleadings and had abandoned their claim for breach of contract. Plaintiffs initial 
complaint sought the relief for "an order mandating the Defendants to sell the property 
pursuant to the terms of the contract (specific performance); enjoining them from selling 
to any other party (injunctive relief); for their damages as proven at trial; for their 
attorney fees. (R at 6) The first amended complaint requested specific performance, 
injunctive relief, damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages arising from theories of 
contract, promissory estoppel, waiver and fraud. (R at 62-63) Defendants answered and 
counterclaimed. Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim stating: 
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f 11. Plaintiffs renew and reassert their right to specific performance. The 
amended complaint set forth additional causes of action, and was not a dismissal of 
the earlier causes of action." (R at 94). 
A second amended complaint requesting specific performance, injunctive relief, 
damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages arising from theories of contract, 
promissory estoppel, waiver and fraud were filed on December 13, 2005 (R at 467-473, 
521)2 All of the complaints included a prayer for relief that include specific 
performance, injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs argued all of these issues in the cross motions for summary judgment, (R 
at 191) and Defendants responded and argued against these issues. (R at 376 et seq.) 
Plaintiffs identified the issues and arguments in detail in their motion to amend. (R at 
647) 
The trial court noted that the Defendants objected to the raising of issues inferring 
that the issues were not 'tried' by express or implied consent leaving the matter to the 
court's discretion. The court noted the tests in Rule 15(b) (1) that neither the merits of the 
case are subserved and (2) the Defendants would be prejudiced if the complaint were 
2
 Defendants even conducted discovery on some of the issues: In Plaintiffs 
Response to Defendants Second Discovery Requests p.5 
Interrogatory NO 12: Set forth the date and terms of the agreements the Plaintiffs 
are seeking the court to enforce. 
ANSWER: See the pleadings. Without amending or limiting the pleadings, in 
short Plaintiffs request the court to either enforce the right of the Plaintiffs to purchase the 
property pursuant to the terms of the August REPC, or in the alternate, to find that 
promissory estoppel requires that the lease option be granted and enforced. See the 
REPC and above for the terms of each agreement. 
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amended - without explaining how Defendants are prejudiced. (R at 781-782). This 
conclusion cannot be supported, because the requested amendments only included claims 
which had already been argued in motions. (R at 643-649) 
Whether or not a pleading can be amended is a due process issue. So long as the 
parties have "notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court" and that notice 
is "given sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation," due process is 
satisfied. IN RE ADOPTION OF S.L.F., 27 P.3d 583, [^10 (Utah 2001). The principle is the 
same whether tried or resolved by summary judgment. Due process requires notice and an 
opportunity to respond. Here the Defendants not only had the opportunity, they actually 
responded to all of the issues which were raised by Plaintiffs. (R at 647) 
The trial court relied on FlBRO TRUST INC. V. BRAHAM FIN., 974 P2d 288, 
291 (Utah 1999) which states that once a party objects at trial then the discretion of the 
trial court is subject to the two part tests. The difference is that in this case there was no 
trial, and that the issues objected to had already been raised and responded to by 
Defendants. At trial a party can protest due process (lack of notice) and is prejudiced -
unless the court found that the parties expressly or impliedly agreed to try the issue. 
"[E]xpress or implied consent of the parties must be evident from the record." COLMAN V. 
COLMAN, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). Here the parties expressly or 
impliedly agreed to litigate the issues because the record shows the parties fully addressed 
all of the issues in their cross motions for summary judgment. The process of summary 
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judgment avoids FiBRO'S notice and preparation objections - particularly when the parties 
argued the issues. 
Further, there is no showing of actual prejudice by the Defendants. Had there 
been a trial in this matter, the court would be required to find that the issues had been 
tried by express or implied consent. An objection by these Defendants would have 
required identification of the new evidence objected to and a hearing and ruling before 
Defendants responded. (Cf. KELLER V. SOUTHWOOD NORTH MEDICAL PAVILION, INC., 
959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998); SLW/UTAH, ARCHULETA V. HUGHES, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1998).) That scenario did not occur. 
The trial court proceeded to the Rule 15(b) two a part test, stating that allowing the 
amendment would not facilitate presentation on the merits because the court had already 
issued its order on summary judgment. (R at 781) But that is the purpose of Rule 15(b) 
which allows amendment "even after judgment. " 
The trial court also relied on the lack of trial (R at 780). However, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate the same rule 15(b). "Although Rule 15 uses the 
word "tried," we accept Rule 15(b) as a guide — by way of analogy, at the appellate level 
— for cases never tried, but litigated on motions." Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 
F.3d 1014, n 4. (11th Cir. 2001)3. 
3
 Rule 15(b)?s "general principle" has been applied at summary judgment stage by other 
Federal circuits in harmony. Cf: Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 2000); 
United States ex rel. Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d 1188, 1193 (5th Cir. 1987); Smith v. 
Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992); Walton v. Jennings Cmty. Hosp. 
Inc., 875 F.2d 1317,1320 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1129 (9th 
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The American legal system encourages the efficient resolution of claims on the 
merits, and not the avoidance of legal issues by means of tightfisted pleading 
requirements that constitute nothing more than traps for the unwary. HARRIS V. GARNER, 
216 F.3d 970, 997 (11th Cir. 2000) (after discussion of Rule 15b)). 
The court was persuaded that the Defendants would be prejudiced if the 
amendment were allowed. (R at 782) The court's justification relied on that the 
Defendants had prepared their case based on the earlier pleadings. That justification is 
disingenuous because the Defendants replied to all of the claims raised by Plaintiffs. 
Further, neither the Defendants nor the court identified any actual prejudice - and could 
not because there was no prejudice. Defendants were on notice and did respond. The 
court's ruling as to prejudice is without foundation and is arbitrary and capricious. 
G. Issue: Is U.C.A. §78-40-2.5 in Conflict with Established Rules of Utah 
Law, or Otherwise Unconstitutional for Depriving Plaintiffs of Due 
Process? 
1. Due Process 
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481. 
Resolution of the issue here involving the constitutional sufficiency of 
administrative procedures prior to the initial termination of benefits and 
pending review, requires consideration of three factors: (1) the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedures would entail. MATHEWS V. 
ELDRIDGE,424U.S.319, 321 (1976). 
Cir. 1979); and Kulkarni v. Alexander, 662 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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The due process analysis turns on three factors: First, the "private interest" 
affected by the filing of a lis pendens. SeeDoehr, 501 U.S. at 11, 111 S.Ct. 
2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1. Second, "the risk of erroneous deprivation through the 
procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or alternative 
safeguards." Id. Third, "the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment 
remedy, with due regard for any interest the government may have in 
providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protections." Id.; see BRITISH INT'L INS. Co. LTD. V. SEGUROS L A 
REPUBLICA, 212 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2000). 
The private interests at risk here are the Plaintiffs' rights in the Ranch property, 
namely their rights under the REPC and/or their rights under the lease option. The risk of 
an erroneous deprivation arises from the lower's courts interpretation that it was 
mandated by the legislature that it must grant the release of the lis pendens, because of 
the lower court's ruling on summary judgment - i.e. no substantial proof of prevailing on 
the merits. (Order August 16, 2006, p. 2) There are safeguards, but, depending on how 
the statute is interpreted, may not come into play unless the lower court is convinced of 
the ultimate outcome of the suit. 
The problem in this case is that the lower court issued summary judgment against 
the Plaintiffs. Therefore §78-40-2.5(3) mandates the release of the lis pendens. 
However, Plaintiffs are pursuing the rights of appeal. But because of the "shall" in §78-
40-2.5(3), the lower court was persuaded that the Plaintiffs' motion under §78-40-2.5(5) 
was not available. 
The third test is the interest of the Defendants. As sellers of the Ranch their 
interest in the release of the lis pendens is to complete the sale, and immediate possession 
of the purchase price from the Gibson buyers. However, the Defendants are not 
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prejudiced by allowing the lis pendens to continue. They earn interest on the purchase 
funds. They are additionally protected by the bond posted by Plaintiffs. They may claim 
inconvenience from not having the sale money immediately, but they are compensated 
through interest. 
However, Plaintiffs are substantially prejudiced because if §78-40-.5(3) controls, 
they lose their property interest in the Ranch before the appeal can be heard. In other 
words, although their claims survive for review, the Plaintiffs are deprived of their 
desired remedy. Monetary damages are not sufficient to make the Plaintiffs whole if they 
prevail, because no similar property is available. Therefore, if this section is not struck 
down or ameliorated, then the Plaintiffs lose their remedy and are deprived of their 
complete due process rights. 
2. Conflict of Law 
Section 2.5 was added in 2004. Section 78-40-2 contains the original lis pendens 
rules. It provides that the notice of lis pendens can be filed at any time. Thus, a notice of 
lis pendens could be filed during an appeal. Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 
P.2dl244, 1247 (Utah 1979). 
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is reversed and remanded with 
specific instruction or directions, the case stands in the lower court precisely as it did 
before a trial was had in the first instance. Id. LARSEN V GASBERG, 43 Utah 203, 134 P. 
885 (1913). Here, if the lis pendens is released, and later this court remands the case to 
the lower court or otherwise finds in favor of Plaintiffs, the case cannot return as it was 
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before - because the property will have been sold and the Plaintiffs will be deprived all 
right of possession, which is the Plaintiffs' primary claim. 
H. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Their Attorney Fees in the Lower 
Court and If They Prevail on Their Appeal? 
The REPC has a clause granting attorney fees if a party prevails in its enforcement 
of the REPC. (R at 236). PANOS v. OLSEN AND ASSOCIATES CONST., INC., 123 P.3d 816, 
822 (Utah 2005); MANAGEMENT SERVS. CORP. v. DEVELOPMENT ASSOCS., 617 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1980). 
One remedy of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the grant of attorney 
fees. LIEBER v. ITT HARTFORD INS. CTR. INC., 15 P.3d 1030, 1(16 (Utah 2000). 
CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO. INS. CO., 65 P.3d 1134, n 20, (Utah 2001). 
X. CONCLUSION 
This case can easily be resolved by enforcement of the REPC. It was a written, 
signed agreement, with earnest money paid and accepted. Plaintiffs timely commenced 
seeking financing according to their duty under the REPC. However, the Defendants first 
breached the REPC by failing to obtain a title commitment and by cancelling escrow. 
However, Defendants did not return the earnest money. Under the terms of the REPC the 
Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance. 
This case also presents a seminal example of an enforceable case of promissory 
estoppel regarding real property. The requirements of the Statute of Frauds and existing 
case law require that in order to enforce promissory estoppel that a writing must exist. 
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Here the REPC is that writing, and its terms were modified by oral agreement as to the 
terms and means of financing. 
Plaintiffs also request this court to find that their amended complaints and motion 
to conform the pleadings be affirmed. The Rules provide for liberal interpretation of 
pleadings - complaints and answers - in order to accomplish a fair and efficient review of 
a party's claims. Substantial justice can only occur if those principles are applied here. 
U.C.A. §78-40-2.5 was recently passed. This is a matter of first impression. This 
statute appears to remove discretion from a lower court and requires removal of a lis 
pendens prior to the competition of the constitutionally provided appeals process. It 
appears in conflict with the history of the doctrine of lis pendens and current statutes. 
Strict application will unjustly deprive the appellants of their property rights and claims 
without due process. The court should review this statute and find that it denies due 
process. 
Plaintiffs request that the trial court's orders be set aside and that the trial courts 
are ordered to enter judgment for Plaintiffs enforcing their rights specific performance 
under the REPC; or in the alternate that the lease options are enforced under the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel; that Plaintiffs be granted their attorney fees and costs under the 
REPC; and that the Plaintiffs bond be released. 
WHEREFORE 
Plaintiffs request that this court reverse the decision of the District Court and hold 
that 
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1. The Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the REPC; 
2. In the alternate the Plaintiffs are entitled to promissory estoppel against 
Defendants and that the lease option must be enforced; 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to amend their complaint to include the issues argued 
in the cross motions for summary judgment; 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the Defendants' breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; 
5. Section 78-40-2.5 is not enforceable to the extent that a district court may 
not force the release of a notice of lis pendens so long as a case is being 
prosecuted or appealed; 
6. Grant Plaintiffs their attorney fees and costs; 
7. AND such other relief as this court deems reasonable and fair. 
Dated: 1^3^<SVil ^ N 
Alvin R. Lundgren ^ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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